

The Institute of Applied Cultural Economics and Sociology

**ACES_001:
Public Funding, Music & Sub-Prime
Culture in The Netherlands**

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Public Funding, Music & Sub-Prime Culture in The Netherlands

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This paper attempts to use an analysis of the system for publicly funding music in the Netherlands to highlight what this author sees as a worrying move towards the free-market mentality in the performing arts that is contributing to a sub-prime culture of art. The paper is split up into two sections: One in which I discuss the structure of the public funding system and particular trends which have recently appeared in it, and the second, in which I speculate on the consequences for the type of tendencies highlighted in the first half of the paper.

The Netherlands provides an ideal barometer of the artistic climate throughout Europe due to its compact size, transparent and well-documented bureaucracy, and funding structures similar to other, neighbouring European countries.

Artistic funding in the Netherlands comes from two sources:

Private funds, such as the *SNS Reaal Fond*, *Fonds 1818*, *VSB Fonds* etc. These were historically set up to fund art (as in the case of *Fonds 1818*), or they are the artistic funding wing of a much larger private concern (as in the case of the *SNS Reaal Fond*, which is tied to the *SNS Reaal* financial conglomerate.¹

Public Funds, these are funds that come out of either the central government, the provinces, or the municipality. This is what I shall be analyzing in this paper.

The main bulk of my research was a diagrammatic analysis of the way in which money flows down from different governmental departments to contemporary music. This involved pooling together

1 *SNS Reaal Fonds*, <http://www.snsrealfonds.nl/>, accessed 21 February 2012

and reconciling many different figures, spread across many different websites and publications (a full list of these is given in Appendix IV to this paper).

The original impetus to create the diagram came out of my own artistic practice as a composer of contemporary classical music. To this end the flow of money I have highlighted is that which pertains not only to the funding of ensembles and orchestras music, but also to the municipal and provincial funding applicable to the area in which I live: *Den Haag (The Hague)*, *Zuid-Holland (South Holland)*. Although this paper concentrates almost exclusively on the funding of music in the Netherlands, because of the standardization in centralized funding that occurred in 2009, I suspect many of my conclusions will also bear out across other art-forms receiving public funding in the Netherlands.

Although I take *Den Haag* and *Zuid-Holland* as the basis for the municipal and provincial funding data in this paper, it should be noted that there is a large disparity at a municipal level between the funding for cities in the highly populated Randstadt area (Den Haag, Rotterdam, Amsterdam) and the rest of the country (see chart below which shows the amount of structural subsidies per city and region):

Fig 1. Totaal aan structureel subsidies, per stad en regio x €1 mln (2005-2008)

Total of structural subsidies, per city and region x €1 mln²

In this graph, the regions used are sets of provinces grouped together according to their geographical proximity:


Midden=Utrecht and Flevoland,

West=Noord-Holland and Zuid-Holland

Noord=Groningen and Drenthe

Zuid=Zeeland, Brabant and Limburg

Oost=Gelderland and Overijssel



Bron: database OCW

The Dutch public funding system is a tri-partite one, consisting of the following components:

Overheid (Government) – The central government

Provincies (Provinces) – There are twelve provinces in the Netherlands: *Groningen, Friesland, Drenthe, Flevoland, Overijssel, Gelderland, Utrecht, Noord-Holland, Zuid-Holland, Zeeland, Noord-Brabant* and *Limburg*. This paper will concentrate on *Zuid Holland*, as this is the province in which Den Haag is situated.

Gemeente (Municipality) – There are 476 different municipalities in The Netherlands, the one which Den Haag is situated is *'s-Gravenhage*, which includes the city of Den Haag, as well as its adjoining port-town of *Scheveningen*.

2 Ministerie van OCW, *Kunst in Cijfers* (Den Haag, January 2010),14

The Diagram

Over the page you will find the diagram. The diagram uses only figures from 2009. The figures pertain to the amount that was *spent* in 2009, not the amount that was budgeted for. Where no figures could be found for a particular part of the diagram, or where two or more conflicting figures were found in the literature, the space is left blank. All figures are in euros. All documents used for the creation of this chart and the rest of the research in this paper can be found in the accompanying .zip file.

Overheid (Government)

The Dutch government spent €216,004,000,000 in 2009. This money then filtered down into a set of thirteen ministries, nine funds, and six other areas of expenditure, including national defense, the royal family etc. At the time of writing the organization of the ministries has changed slightly, i.e. ministerie van Justitie is now Veiligheid en Justitie, and there are only eleven) this organization circa. 2009.

Fig 2. Outgoing and Incoming of Ministries in 2009 in €mln.³

Ministerie	Outgoing	Incoming	Balance
ministerie van Algemene Zaken <i>(Ministry of General Affairs)</i>	71	3	-68
ministerie van Binnenlands Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties <i>(Ministry of Internal Affairs and Kingdom Relations)</i>	6012	899	-5113
ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken <i>(Ministry of Foreign Affairs)</i>	11136	2936	-8201
ministerie van Defensie <i>(Ministry Of Defense)</i>	8733	467	-8266
ministerie van Economische Zaken <i>(Ministry of Economic Affairs)</i>	2806	9834	7028
ministerie van Financiën <i>(Ministry of Finance)</i>	14045	121322	107277
ministerie van Justitie <i>(Ministry of Justice)</i>	6240	1315	-4925
ministerie van Landbouw, Natuur en Voedselkwaliteit <i>(Ministry of Landscape, Nature and Food Quality)</i>	2550	514	-2036
ministerie van Onderwijs, Cultuur en Wetenschap <i>(Ministry of Education, Culture and Science)</i>	36285	2216	-34070
ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid <i>(Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment)</i>	26901	913	-25987
ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat <i>(Ministry of Transport and Water Management)</i>	9075	98	-8977
ministerie van Volksgezondheid, Welzijn en Sport <i>(Ministry of Public Health, Wellbeing and Sport)</i>	15268	569	-14699
ministerie van Volkshuisvesting, Ruimtelijke Ordening en Milieubeheer <i>(Ministry of Housing, Planning and the Environment)</i>	1488	330	-1158
Total:	140610	141416	805

Fig 3. Funds 2009⁴

Fonds	Outgoing	Incoming	Balance
BTW-compensatiefonds	2577	2577	-
Diergezondheidsfonds	23	23	-
Fonds Economische Structuurversterking	1724	1724	-
Gemeentefonds	17683	17683	-
Infrastructuurfonds	7352	7724	372
Landbouw egaliseringsfonds			
Provinciefonds	1329	1329	-
Spaarfonds AOW	40424	40424	-
Waddenfonds	63	63	-
Total:	71175		

3 From CBS Statline: <http://statline.cbs.nl>, accessed 20 October 2011

4 ibid

Fig 4. Other expenses⁵

Fonds	Outgoing	Incoming	Balance
Hoge Colleges van Staat	110	4	-106
Huis der Koningin	7	0	-7
Jeugd en Gezin	6499	140	-6359
Nationale schuld	62976	67513	4537
Koninkrijksrelaties	608	128	-480
Wonen, Wijken en Integratie	5061	997	-4065
Total:	75261		

The three ways in which money flows down to the arts from the central government are via the *provinciefonds*, the *gemeentefonds* and the *ministerie van Onderwijs, Cultuur en Wetenschap* (OCW). The *provinciefonds* and *gemeentefonds* are funds which are made available by the Dutch government to supplement the incomes of the provinces and municipalities, whose main incomes come from provincial and municipal taxes.

The main priority of the OCW is education. In 2009, “Cultuur” (culture), made up only €934,749,000 of its €36,285mIn total budget (2.58%), with the largest proportion going towards primary-level education (€9,567,428,000).


The further division of the ministerie van OCW will be treated in more detail further on in this paper, for the moment we shall consider the finances of the Provinces and Gemeenten.

5 ibid

Provincies (Provinces)

Provincial funding provides the smallest contribution to artistic projects, especially musical ones. The figures below show that, on average, the majority of the public money received for music festivals and concerts comes from municipal (27%) and centralized (13%) subsidy, whilst provincial funding only accounts for approximately 6% of the total income. It is important to note that this is an average figure which only accounts for festivals and concerts, and that the structural funding for orchestras, ensembles, projects etc. is highly idiosyncratic.

Fig. 5 Income by type for Muziekpodia and Festivals in 2008⁶.



Despite the apparently small contribution to musical life, the province of *Zuid-Holland* still spent €76,900,000 euros on *art and antiques* (*kunst en oudheidkunde*). The designation of “arts and antiques” points to one of the more problematic aspects of accounting for the way in which money circulates in this system; that although all the information about government spending is made available, often the myriad of papers have a diverse and confusing way of encapsulating their budgets. For instance, “art” can have its own designated spending category or, depending upon the organization, can be bundled together as “art and antiques”, “art and media”, “art and museums”, “culture” etc. The author presumes that this bundling is a result not only of a failure to standardize budget and *jaarrekening* reports on an intergovernmental level, but that it probably springs out of the type of statistical mis-direction which occurs when bureaucratic organizations attempt to meet targets, impress employers or avoid scandals.

⁶ Muziek Centrum Nederlands *Muziekpodia en Festivals in Beeld 2008*, 2010

Gemeente (Municipality)

In 2009, the municipality of 's-Gravenhage spent €2,753,484,000. The city received €802,690,000 from the *gemeentefonds* and received the rest from the varied sources listed below. Out of the total income, the city took in €119mln in taxes in 2009. As you can see from the diagram on page 3, the budget for culture in Den Haag in 2009 (actually budgeted as “cultuur & media”) came to €117,388,000, of which €7,745,000 was set aside for music.

Fig 6 General Income⁷

Algemene dekkingsmiddelen	(bedragen in €1.000)		
	Baten Rekening 2009	Baten Begroting 2009	Baten Rekening 2008
Algemene uitkering Gemeentefonds	802.690	795.883	752.947
Onroerend Zaakbelasting (incl. Wet WOZ)	82.717	82.010	83.209
Hondenbelasting	1.293	1.350	1.340
Toeristenbelasting	3.712	3.716	4.295
Precariobelasting	15.890	15.839	15.413
Parkeerbelasting	14.563	14.698	11.501
Overige belastingen	1.101	658	3.052
Dividend (beleggingen)	61.417	65.104	60.665
Rente	123.154	121.936	129.199
Erfpachtinkomsten	18.700	21.000	22.100
Overige dekkingsmiddelen	2.266	2.107	2.118
Totaal	1.127.503	1.124.301	1.085.839

Ministerie van Onderwijs, Cultuur en Wetenschap

The actual breakdown of budgetary detail for the ministrie van OCW is extremely hard to trace, the numerous monies being subjected to ever more complex and non-corresponding compartmentalization. However, what does seem to be clear is that their total budget for 2009 included €581,105,405 in subsidies⁸. This money is supplemented by €482,562,364 of extra income, most of which is money from municipal or provincial funding. The money that is part of the “cultuur” budget but is not spent on subsidies is used for library funding, monument upkeep, the National Archive, and can be seen in the table below, which shows the amount spent for the years 2008-2010.

⁷ Den Haag Jaarrekening 2009, downloaded from www.denhaag.nl, 11

⁸ 2009 Raad Voor Cultuur Jaarverlag (Den Haag, 2010), 65

Fig 7. Breakdown of cultural budget 2008-2010⁹

Tabel 14.3 Budgettaire gevolgen van beleid artikel 14 (Bedragen x € 1 000)							
					Realisatie	Vastgestelde begroting	Verschil
	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2010	2010
Verplichtingen	1 348 621	814 454	2 779 161	918 594	1 130 082	611 712	518 370
Waarvan garantieverplichtingen	831 300	375 373	253 465	432 305	767 539 ¹		
Totale uitgaven	932 844	874 163	946 945	934 749	991 219	951 738	39 481
Programma-uitgaven	878 403	816 960	887 290	866 190	928 913	903 249	25 664
<i>Bevorderen van de deelname van de burgers aan Cultuuruitingen</i>	<i>497 427</i>	<i>520 150</i>	<i>533 407</i>	<i>599 049</i>	<i>599 775</i>	<i>584 580</i>	<i>15 195</i>
• Cultuurnota 2009–2012 ²	439 388	456 199	474 186	567 272	571 272	552 678	18 594
– 4 jarig				100 617	96 469	97 311	– 842
– producerend				75 155	69 785	69 949	– 164
– niet producerend				25 462	26 684	27 362	– 678
– Langjarig				305 405	304 741	293 867	10 874
– producerend				273 953	268 527	264 910	3 617
<i>waarvan Musea</i>				153 258	156 953	150 802	6 151
– niet producerend				31 452	36 214	28 957	7 257
– Fondsen				161 250	170 062	161 500	8 562
• Verbreden inzet Cultuur	56 579	63 818	58 945	25 896	21 971	26 262	– 4 291
• Internationaal Cultuurbeleid (HGIS)	1 460	133	276	5 881	6 532	5 640	892
<i>Behoud en Beheer Cultureel Erfgoed</i>	<i>300 256</i>	<i>202 875</i>	<i>262 307</i>	<i>180 752</i>	<i>231 208</i>	<i>222 105</i>	<i>9 103</i>
• Archieven	22 994	23 549	25 924	27 213	27 618	26 222	1 396
• Beelden voor de toekomst	0	12 546	25 578	24 551	46 896	23 468	23 428
<i>waarvan FES</i>	0	0	0	0	21 896	22 032	– 136
• Musea: huisvesting	54 656	68 501	65 656	18 324	26 208	27 202	– 994
• Musea (buiten de Cultuursubsidies 2009–2012)	6 906	8 323	8 017	15 736	18 325	19 143	– 818
• Mooier Nederland	0	0	0	0	900	6 743	– 5 843
• Monumenten	207 423	71 866	130 057	90 403	109 786	110 397	– 611
• Archeologie	2 253	12 463	2 000	740	658	2 725	– 2 067
<i>waarvan FES</i>					0	1 750	– 1 750
• Overige instrumenten	6 024	5 627	5 075	3 785	817	6 205	– 5 388
<i>Bibliotheken</i>	<i>29 272</i>	<i>40 799</i>	<i>35 378</i>	<i>32 232</i>	<i>32 299</i>	<i>31 179</i>	<i>1 120</i>
• Subsidies	667	825	731	0	0	0	0
• Bibliotheekvernieuwing	15 238	26 965	21 040	16 869	17 730	18 500	– 770
• Leesvoorziening leesgehandicapten	13 367	13 009	13 607	13 463	11 589	9 679	1 910
• Programma leesbevordering	0	0	0	1 900	2 980	3 000	– 20
<i>Programmakosten overig</i>	<i>36 130</i>	<i>25 221</i>	<i>36 773</i>	<i>31 453</i>	<i>43 339</i>	<i>47 581</i>	<i>– 4 242</i>
<i>Nationaal Archief waarvan Informatie op Orde (Archief-achterstanden)</i>	<i>15 318</i>	<i>27 915</i>	<i>19 425</i>	<i>22 704</i>	<i>22 292</i>	<i>17 804</i>	<i>4 488</i>
						500	
Apparaatsuitgaven	54 441	57 203	59 655	68 559	62 306	48 489	13 817
• Bestuursdepartement	10 955	10 760	10 423	10 740	9 534	9 131	403
• Uitvoeringsdiensten	43 486	46 443	49 232	57 819	52 772	39 358	13 414

This €581,105,405 of cultural subsidy money then breaks down into eleven areas including dance, museums and fine art exhibition funding. In relation to music funding there are three areas that are of interest to us: *Orchestral Funding (Orkesten)*, *Sector Institution funding (Sectorinstituten)*, and the (*Fondsen*).

Orchestral Funding

It is important to note that orchestral funding is continuous, and not subject to the four and two year structural subsidy cycles that characterize ensembles which receive their money from the *Fonds voor Podiumkunsten* (discussed later in this paper). There are ten continuously funded orchestras that can be seen in the table below which breaks down the sources of orchestral

⁹ Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 2010–2011, 32 710 VIII, nr. 1, pg 121

funding from 2005-2008. The figures given are averages of the total amount per year offered over this period.

The proportion of *OCW*, *Gemeente* and *Provincie* funding varies considerably between each orchestra. This bias seems to often be accounted for by regional affiliations in their nomenclature i.e. the orchestras which have a province or municipality in their title get proportionally more provincial or municipal funding. Notice how the non-geographically-specific *Nederlands Philharmonisch Orkest* and *stichting Het Nederlands Ballet- en Symfonieprkest Holland Symfonia* receive no *Gemeente* or *Provincie* funding. The orchestras seen below, are the same ones that received funding in 2009.

Fig. 8 Average of orchestral funding 2005-2008, broken down by Gemeente/Province/Central funding¹⁰

	Totale baten €	Subsidie OCW €	Subsidie gemeente €	Subsidie provincie €
ORKESTEN (10)				
Stichting Het Brabants Orkest	7.206.733	5.529.708	84.241	150.945
Stichting Het Gelders Orkest	7.487.597	5.598.770	66.843	282.200
Stichting Koninklijk Concertgebouworkest	20.768.471	4.136.545	6.200.573	0
Stichting Limburgs Symphonie Orkest	6.232.667	4.885.512	78.373	120.048
Stichting Nederlands Philharmonisch Orkest	13.011.625	10.203.645	0	0
Stichting Noord Nederlands Orkest	7.715.050	6.209.672	0	100.000
Stichting Orkest van het Oosten	6.684.725	5.260.756	89.545	296.276
Stichting Het Residentie Orkest	10.541.250	3.366.500	5.272.000	0
Stichting Rotterdams Philharmonisch Orkest	13.702.780	3.362.848	6.129.583	0
Stichting Het Nederlands Ballet- en Symfonieorkest Holland Symfonia	10.167.639	9.254.137	0	0
<i>Totaal categorie</i>	103.518.537	57.808.093	17.921.158	949.469
<i>Gemiddelde instelling</i>	10.351.854	5.780.809	1.792.116	94.947

Sector Institutions and The Funds


In 2009, a re-organization of the funding system took place, resulting in the current system, illustrated in Fig. 10. In this system eight funds - responsible for allocating four year structural subsidy and short-term project subsidies to a specific artform - are coupled with eight sector institutions, which have an organizational and facilitation role for that specific art form. These can be seen below in Fig. 9

¹⁰ Kunst in Cijfers, 70

Fig 9. Funds and Sector Institutions

Sector	Fund	Sector Institution
Film	<i>Filmfonds</i>	<i>EYE Filminstituut</i>
Performing Arts	<i>Fonds voor de Podiumkunsten</i>	<i>Muziek Centrum Nederlands, Nederlands Muziek Instituut & Theater Instituut Nederlands</i>
Architecture	<i>Stimuleringsfonds voor Architectuur</i>	<i>Nederlands Architectuur Instituut</i>
Cultural Participation	<i>Fonds voor Cultuur Participatie</i>	<i>Kunstfactor (for amateur art)</i>
Fine Art and Sculpture	<i>Fonds voor Beeldende Kunsten, vormgeving en bouwkunst & Mondriaan Stichting</i>	<i>Premsele (Netherlands Instituut for fashion and Design)</i>
Dutch Literature and Translation	<i>Nederlands Literatuur productie en Vertalingsfonds</i>	-
Literature	<i>Fonds voor de Letteren</i>	-
Heritage	-	<i>Erfgoed Nederland (Netherlands Instituut for Heritage)</i>
E-Culture	-	<i>Virtueel Platform</i>

Fig 10. Diagram of the new funding system implemented in 2009¹¹



In terms of music, the fund we will be interested in is the *Fonds voor Podiumkunsten (Fund for Performing Arts)*¹², and there are two sector institutions relevant to our discussion: the *Nederlands Muziek Instituut* and *Muziek Centrum Nederlands*.

11 Press release OCW *Het nieuwe subsidieysteem voor de kunsten*, 2

12 I will be abbreviating *Fonds voor Podiumkunsten* as (N)FPK(+) for the rest of this essay due to the many changes in nomenclature that have occurred in this organization from 2009 to the present. In November 2007, three separate performing arts were fused into the NFPK+, this was later abbreviated to NFPK, then later the “Nederlands” and “+” were dropped from the title, to leave it as FPK.

Fig 11. Sector Institutions circa. 2009¹³

Sectorinstituten	EYE	NAI	Kunstfactor	MCN	TIN	Premisela	Erfgoed Nederland	Virtueel Platform	NMI
Subsidie OCW	7.558.000 ¹	6.466.204	5.453.317	4.914.280	4.024.357	2.857.576	2.211.008	568.501	272.113
Overige middelen	781.000 ²	1.354.902	589.647	771.236	2.241.934	712.574	679.415	107.488	423.058
Eigen opbrengsten	2.122.000	1.948.689	278.906	602.578	655.175	Geen	333.853	35.196	29.581
Aantal fte	120,3	69,4	54	42,9	38	16	29	5,2	7,5
Aantal medewerkers	158	76	84	57	65	21	40	7	12
Solvabiliteit 2009	77/57/33/16% ²	48%	34%	28%	70%	71%	56%	31%	16%
Solvabiliteit 2008	64/33/49/2%	39%	16%	26%	83%	43%	69%	34%	22%
Liquiditeitsratio 2009	4,17/2,26/1,5/0,87	1,30	1,00	2,57	3,09	3,15	2,14	1,42	0,80
Liquiditeitsratio 2008	2,73/1,47/1,95/0,82	2,19	0,75	2,64	7,79	1,53	3,10	1,52	3,15
Overhead 2009 ³	18/50/37/19%	46%	21%	20%	50% ⁴	40%	29%	30%	48 ⁶
Overhead 2008 ³	20/49/31/33%	40%	26%	15% ⁵	47%	30%	19%	19%	48%

¹ Afkomstig uit de begroting voor 2010.

² De solvabiliteit, liquiditeitsratio en overhead is over 2009 steeds weergegeven voor respectievelijk: Filmbank, Stichting Holland Film Promotion, Stichting Nederlands Instituut voor Filmeducatie en Stichting Nederland Filmmuseum.

³ De overheadpercentages moeten voorzichtig worden geïnterpreteerd; zie toelichting.

⁴ TIN heeft de overhead tot op heden niet intern doorberekend. De percentages in de tabel gaan uit van de totale beheerslasten zoals die in jaarrekeningen zijn vermeld. TIN heeft in reactie hierop zelf doorberekend dat de overhead kan dalen tot 30,5% in 2008 en 20,1% in 2009 als anders wordt omgegaan met verhuis- en reorganisatiekosten, het salaris van de directeur, de huur van de mediatheek en de pensioengelden.

⁵ De overheadpercentages geven een vertekend beeld als gevolg van frictiekosten t.b.v. de fusie.

⁶ Het NMI licht toe dat veel kosten die nu zijn gerekend als beheerslasten, evengoed onder activiteitenlasten geschaard kunnen worden. Hierdoor ontstaat een ander beeld. Te denken valt aan personeelskosten, depot- en computerhuur, direct ten behoeve van de primaire activiteit van het NMI. Op deze wijze berekend, komt het NMI

The *Nederlands Muziek Instituut* is more or less an archival institute, describing itself as “the central institution for the preservation of the musical heritage of the Netherlands.”¹⁴ Thus, its participation in active music making in the Netherlands is somewhat limited – this also explains its relatively small budget of €724,725.¹⁵

13 *Visitatierapport 2010: Cultuurfondsen en sectorinstituten* (Den Haag, 23 december 2010), 39

14 *Nederlands Muziek Instituut*, <http://www.nederlandsmuziekinstituut.nl/>, Accessed 16 February 2012

15 *Visitatierapport 2010: Cultuurfondsen en sectorinstituten* (Den Haag, 23 december 2010), 38

Fonds voor Podiumkunsten

The *Fonds voor Podiumkunsten*, or Funds for Performing Arts is one of the eight funds which allocates money through the ministerie van OCW, details about itself and the others can be seen in fig. 12 below.

Fig 12. Information about funds circa 2009¹⁶

Fondsen	Fonds Podiumkunsten	Filmfonds	Fonds voor Cultuurparticipatie	Mondriaan Stichting	Fonds BKVB	Stimuleringsfonds voor Architectuur
Totaal baten	188.253.538 ¹	38.731.971	27.917.275	22.578.093	18.130.640	4.266.415 ⁴
Subsidie van OCW	187.573.110 ¹	37.057.812	26.942.144	21.123.289	17.863.159	4.193.957 ⁵
Totaalbedrag subsidies verleend door fondsen	183.311.689 ¹	35.512.852	25.351.568	19.233.109	21.257.770	3.209.540 ⁶
Aantal adviseurs	147	72	30	142	252	18
Aantal fte	48	19,85	18	17,7	19,9	5
Aantal medewerkers	55	26	20	23	23	6
Aantal aanvragen	1.895	1.338	1044 (969 plusregeling) ³	1.168	2.903	497
Aantal honoreringen	923	578	299 (plusregeling) ³	673	958	141
% gehonoreerd	49%	43%	31%	58%	33%	28%
% nieuwkomers (onder alle aanvragers)	30% (4-jarig) 20% (overig)	9% (25% debuterend regisseur of schrijver)	-	46,6%	35%	45%
% bezwaren	6,5% (project; 48) 11,7% (2-jarig; 7) 26,5% (4-jarig; 45)	2,4% (32)	<2,5% (alles) <4% (afwijzingen)	2% (24)	4,7% (137)	1,5% (5)
% herziene aanvragen	20% (project; 10) 0% (2-jarig; 0) 4% (4-jarig; 2)	9% (3)	>25% (5)	25% (6)	24% (33)	0% (0)
Behandeltermijn	98% binnen 3 mnd	>90% binnen 2 mnd	81% binnen 3 mnd	27 dagen	95% binnen 2 mnd	Gem. 7-8 weken
Gemiddelde bijdrage fonds aan project in %	-	43%	max. 50%	15,9%	50%	24%
Klanttevredenheid	-	6,8	-	73% (zeer) tevreden	7,9 (gehonoreerd) 6,2 (afgewezen)	-
Solvabiliteit 2009	5%	2%	3%	6%	9%	11%
Solvabiliteit 2008	38%	9%	59%	15%	42%	64%
Liquiditeitsratio 2009	2,51	1,09	2,97	2,45	2,06	2,22
Liquiditeitsratio 2008	1,34	1,50	2,69	1,28	1,75	1,71
Overhead 2009	3% ²	8%	8%	8%	8%	13%
Overhead 2008	25%	7%	27%	9%	6%	14%

¹ In dit bedrag zijn de volledige bedragen opgenomen van de vierjarige en tweejarige subsidies, dit bedraagt €170.602.729.

² De lage overhead houdt direct verband met de vierjarige- en tweejarige subsidies die volledig ten laste van 2009⁵ Subsidie OCW (architectuur, HGIS) + bijdragen Stedenbouw (393.500) vallen.

³ De cijfers hebben betrekking op de periode 1 jan. 2009 – 1 mei 2010.

⁴ Dit bedrag is inclusief Belvédère en exclusief DutchDFA.

⁵ Dit zijn de verleende subsidies architectuur en HGIS, exclusief DutchDFA.

Its remit covers several disciplines: music, music theatre, theatre, and dance. The scope of the fund means that its budget is significantly higher than the other funds. However, in the data presented in both the chart and above, this figure is also distorted due to a number of reasons. Unfortunately, at the time of writing it was not possible to obtain comprehensive figures for any dates later than 2009, and earlier dates do not reflect the current organization of the funding system, due to the change discussed above, which came into effect in that year. The distortion of figures, especially in regard to the *Fonds voor Podiumkunsten* is due to the timetabling of its funding. The fund distributes money for four and two year project subsidies, two music prizes (the *Ton Lutzprijs* and *Nederlandse Muziekprijs*), non-international festivals, travel costs, commissions and grants. For the four- and two- year subsidies all of the money which a recipient would be entitled to receive over the length of the cycle is distributed to them at the start of the cycle.

e.g. If *Ensemble X* applies for a four-year project subsidy of €10,000 per annum as part of the 2009-2012 funding cycle, they will receive the entirety of the amount that they would get over the four year period at the start of the cycle. i.e. they would receive all €40,000 in 2009.


As 2009 was the start of both the four-year and two-year cycles, the expenditure of the fund for 2009 will be significantly higher than that for the subsequent years.

16 *Visitatierapport 2010: Cultuurfondsen en sectorinstituten* (Den Haag, 23 december 2010), 38

It is interesting to note that, because of the separation between the orchestral subsidies and that of other ensembles and the lack of any type of guaranteed indefinite funding distributed by the fund, many of the Netherlands top ensembles are forced to receive their funding as part of the four year cycle, with no guarantee that it will be renewed at the cycle's conclusion.

Below, a chart shows the way that money is distributed in the four-year cycle for 2009-2012 (this cycle is normally reserved only for those ensembles with a certain amount of historical clout or proven longevity).

Fig 13. Four Year Project Subsidy FPK figures for 2009-2012¹⁷
(see Appendix I for a full breakdown of these figures)



As is apparent from the chart above and its companion data in *Appendix I*, those ensembles and institutions with an established history dominate the amount of money distributed, the top five recipients receiving 23.42% of the total amount given out to four-year project subsidies in the 2009-2012 cycle. The highlighting of this bias towards established institutions is not meant to imply a value judgement, as an institution such as *Het Internationaal Danstheater* has substantial personnel, administrative and property needs, that might not be relevant to those institutions that received less funding.

The four-year project subsidies make up the majority of the money spent by the (N)FPK(+). In 2009, four-year project subsidies accounted for €163,090,265 of its €188,253,538 expenditure – 86.63%¹⁸.

17 *Jaarverslag 2009*, Fonds Podium Kunsten (Den Haag, 2010), 32-34 - compiled by author.

18 *Jaarverslag 2009*, Fonds Podium Kunsten (Den Haag, 2010), 24-25

Composition

One of the other important functions of the *(N)FPK(+)*, in terms of its relation to the funding of music in the Netherlands, is the way in which it funds composers. This is done through various means, from the covering of travel costs for performances of works (sometimes as little as €60), up to the giving out of no-strings-attached grants for tens of thousands of euros. In order to understand how the *(N)FPK(+)* was facilitating composition in the Netherlands, I compiled the total amount of money that went to composers through any method from January 2009-December 2011. The results are shown in Fig. 15 below. These figures do not quite show the whole story, as anybody who is familiar with Dutch musical cultural will notice, there are several big named composers missing from the table. This is in part due to the three-year nature of the large honorariums (*honoreringen*), some of which were awarded to several very large-name composers in 2008, just prior to this data-set. The *honoreringen* amount is meant to subsidize the composer for three years meaning that in effect one awarded in 2008 is designed to cover the period 2008-2010 (inclusive). Due to the structural change in the funding system that occurred in 2009, I felt that it would skew the data too much to incorporate the 2008 figures into the data. Instead, I present below the composers who received the three year *honoreringen* in 2008 as an addendum to the main data below.

Fig. 14 Composers who received a three year honorarium in 2008.¹⁹ Only composers named in the *(N)FPK(+)* Jaarverlag data are included. Occasionally a commission was only listed by its project name, and the composer involved was hard to trace or it was difficult to find out how the budget was broken down between composer and ensemble, these figures were not included.

Verleningen Meerjarige Honoreringen


<i>Bondt, de C.</i>		<i>94.500</i>
<i>Janssen, G.</i>		<i>88.200</i>
<i>Jeths, W.</i>		<i>81.900</i>
<i>Padding, M.</i>		<i>75.600</i>
<i>Torstensson, K.</i>		<i>94.500</i>
<i>Wagemans, P.J.</i>		<i>88.200</i>
<i>Subtotaal aantal verleningen: 6</i>	<i>Subtotaalbedrag verleningen Meerjarige Honoreringen</i>	<i>522.900</i>

¹⁹ *Jaarverslag: Het Eerst Viertien Maanden*, Nederlands Fonds voor Podium Kunsten (Den Haag, 2009),

Fig 15. Composers' incomes from the (N)FPK(+) 2009-2011. These figures do not include Jazz Composition which is budgeted separately and include anything from travel expenses to grants.

These are the top 25 composers who received the most money along with a pie chart to show the distribution of public money amongst all composers who received money. A full breakdown of the figures can be found in Appendix II.²⁰

Rijnos, R.	102900
Putte, Jan van de	90875
Vries K. 3-jarige honorering 2010-2013 87.750	87750
Tarenskeen, Boudewijn	86325
Meijering, Chiel	86000
Zuidam R.	85800
Aa M. 3-jarige honorering 2010-2013 81.000	81000
Vriend, Jan	80750
Ketting, O.	79200
Verbey T.	79200
Adriaansz, Peter	76500
Rossum, Piet-Jan van	75250
Dramm, David	74500
Boogman, Willem	74250
Verbugt, Eric	73100
Kulenty, Hanna	72250
Tsoupaki, Calliope	68000
Koolmees H.	66000
Raaf R.	66000
Vleggaar, Giel	66000
Beurden, Bernard van	63600
Lann, Vanessa	59950
Moore, K.	53095
Andriessen, L.	53025
Kyriakides Y.	51500



€4,997,410 spent in total on contemporary composers. The top 10% of composers control 37.08% of wealth.

Muziek Centrum Nederlands and ASKO Schonberg Ensemble: A Case Study

In examining the bureaucratic construction of the mechanisms which distribute public money towards music in the Netherlands, a worrying trend towards the free market became apparent. This could be seen in two of the organizations which I analyzed more closely: *Muziek Centrum Nederlands (MCN)* and *ASKO Schoenberg Ensemble*.

Muziek Centrum Nederlands

Muziek Centrum Nederlands is one of the *Sector Institutions* and, in 2009, spent €6,306,094, receiving the bulk of its money from the *ministerie van OCW* (€4,914,280). €5,053,159 of the money it received went on organizing activities, and it is here that we see the first indication of a trend towards the market.²¹ Below in Fig. 16 is a copy of part of the *MCN* balance sheet for 2009.

20 (N)FPK(+) *Jaarverslagen* from 2009-2011 – compiled by author.

21 *Jaarrekening 2009* Muziek Centrum Nederland, 3

Fig. 16 Part of the MCN Balance Sheet 2009²²

LASTEN	2009	Begroting 2009	2008
Beheerlasten			
Beheerlasten personeel	€ 357.231	€ 362.000	€ 337.170
Beheerlasten materieel	870.248	865.000	950.982
Frictie kosten	0	0	2.550.000
Totaal beheerlasten	€ 1.227.479	€ 1.227.000	€ 3.838.152
Activiteitenlasten			
Activiteitenlasten personeel	€ 2.101.720	€ 2.057.304	€ 2.059.046
MIC	326.973	327.075	304.983
Uitgeverij	561.272	403.575	430.902
Hedendaags	394.368	412.950	558.410
Klassiek	148.847	161.000	92.970
Jazz en Wereldmuziek	339.522	246.000	699.146
Pop	819.891	823.000	614.064
Staf	192.136	105.000	59.053
Programma's muziek	149.167	162.500	
Educatie	19.263	20.000	
Totaal activiteitenlasten	€ 5.053.159	€ 4.718.404	€ 4.818.574
TOTAAL DER LASTEN	€ 6.280.638	€ 5.945.404	€ 8.656.726

There is a clear discrepancy between the amount spent on contemporary (hedendaags) music and the amount spent on popular music, with pop music receiving at least twice as much money.


This on its own would be scanty evidence for a slow shift occurring in government-funded organizations towards the free market, yet when seen in the context of the figures that I compiled for the *ASKO Schoenberg Ensemble*, it points that the whims of the marketplace are becoming more and more of a factor in the orientation of public-funded music organizations.

ASKO Schoenberg Ensemble

Below is a chart showing the concert output of *ASKO Schoenberg Ensemble* between January and December 2011. They played 112 concerts, mostly in the Netherlands. What is alarming is that 49.11% of their output was not the modernist music, of the type that their name alludes to but it instead was Kurt Weill's *Dreigrosschenoper (Threepenny Opera)*. This opera is particularly famous for its tune *Mack The Knife* which has been performed by popular music singers from Frank Sinatra to Robbie Williams and is probably one of the most marketable of early twentieth century operas, due to its incorporation of popular music harmonic and melodic tropes, and use of an instrumentation synonymous with the popular music-hall conventions of the time (1928).

²² *Jaarrekening 2009* Muziek Centrum Nederland, 3

Fig 17. The concert output of ASKO Schonberg Ensemble (1 Jan 2011 – 31 Dec 2011).²³ The first figure after the name is the number of concerts of this repertoire played, the second is the percentage that this makes up of the total amount of concerts. A detailed breakdown of the figures can be found in *Appendix III*.



The reasons for this move towards the free market are probably to be found in the current political climate. Although the Netherlands has become somewhat internationally synonymous with a left-leaning mentality, something nearly entirely due to its forward-thinking socialist governments of the 1960s, there has been a slow moving creep to the right of the political spectrum. With the cuts upon culture which will come fully into effect in 2013, it seems to this author that the subsumption of ASKO's cultural output to something as populist as the *Threepenny Opera* is hardly co-incidental. The government assesses success purely through economic means, and the way in which the cuts upon culture will occur will undoubtedly be based upon the free-market criteria of profitability and popularity. It is here that we see that the concentration upon the repeated performance of a popular and profitable work is not meant as an end in itself, but as a way of justifying to the government the ensemble's continued funding, using the governments own criteria.

However, this brings a number of problems which the rest of this paper will attempt to deal with. Firstly, the impossibility of justifying the ensembles continued existence through these means due to the nature of Baumol's cost disease and Category Positioning. Secondly, the unavoidable problems of the sustainability of new/contemporary-music creation under a free market system, due to the inability of markets to foster diversity, quality or innovation.

Of course, this problem would not have arisen if the government had stuck to one of the key principles of Western Liberal Democracy: *The Government is there to correct for errors in the market place*. In Western Europe we have forgotten about this cardinal rule and have instead let

²³ Various Agendas for 2011, ASKO Schonberg Ensemble – compiled by the author.

our governments fail to perform this correction. Instead of directing money towards sectors which could not be supported by the free market (such as contemporary art), the interlinking of government and business has led to an investment approach which has been controlled by the dictates of the free-market. As we shall see, this interlinking of free-market and government will lead to a number of problems.

The *ASKO Schoenberg Ensemble* will never be able to justify their worthiness to a government using the free-market to define their assessment criteria because of two reasons: Category Positioning and Baumol's Cost Disease.

Category Positioning is an idea from marketing. It's basic premise is that commodities are arranged into categories. Once a category has been established it is subject to the "ratchet effect", which means that whoever established that category cannot be usurped from the top of it, implying the only way to be top of a category is to create one. e.g. tomato ketchup is a category that you would find at a supermarket. As Heinz and Daddy's created the category of ketchup, or were market leaders at its inception, there will be no other brand that will be able to take over from them as the top ketchup. However, if another company should create another category e.g. "budget ketchup", then they can be leaders of this category. What this means in terms of *ASKO Schoenberg's* predicament, is that by moving from a category they are already at the top of "modernist new music ensemble in the Netherlands" to a category which they are not the top of "populist musical ensemble" they lose potential value. The *ASKO Schoenberg* is full of extremely talented players but, in choosing to play such simplistic music as Kurt Weill, they undermine the "artificial economy of scarcity" that gives them value. In other words, by playing music that anyone can play and not music that only they can play, they make themselves, not a unique institution of players with irreplaceable skill, but utterly replaceable.

Baumol's Cost Disease is another reason that *ASKO* will fail to justify their continued existence using the value criteria of the free market. Baumol's Cost Disease is an idea first introduced in the book *Performing Arts: The Economic Dilemma* by William J. Baumol and William G. Bowen in 1965²⁴. In it they posited that the performing arts would always lose money due to what they termed an "endemic cost disease". The cost disease occurs because, whilst performers' wages rise in parallel to that of the rest of the economy due to the interlinking of labour markets, their production does not increase, as James Heilbrun explains:

"Productivity is defined by economists as physical output per work hour. Increases in productivity over time may occur for the following reasons: (1) increased capital per worker, (2) improved technology, (3) increased labour skill, (4) better management, and (5) economies of scale as output rises. As this list suggests, increases in productivity are most readily achieved in industries that use of a lot of machinery and equipment. In such industries output per worker can be increased either by using more machinery or by investing in new equipment that embodies improved technology...."

... As Baumol and Bowen point out, the conditions of production [in the performing arts] preclude any substantial change in productivity because 'the work of the performer is an end in itself, not a means for the production of some good' (ibid., p.164). Since the performer's labour *is* the output – the singer singing, the dancer dancing, the pianist playing – there is really no way to increase output per hour. It takes four musicians as much playing time to perform a Beethoven string quartet today as it did in 1800."²⁵

This inability to increase output is manifested as a loss in value as the productivity and wages of other industries in the interlinked labour market increase. Thus, the *ASKO Schonberg Ensemble* and all performing artists are destined to lose money in the long-run, failing the test of validity

24 *Baumol's Cost Disease*, James Heilbrun, "A Handbook of Cultural Economics" Ed. Ruth Towse (Massachusetts, 2003), 103

25 *Baumol's Cost Disease*, James Heilbrun, "A Handbook of Cultural Economics" Ed. Ruth Towse (Massachusetts, 2003), 103

through economic criteria that they are trying so hard to satisfy.

Diversity

Market systems tend towards monopoly.

As the musician Bob Osterdag points out:

“In 1983, 50 corporations dominated US mass media, and the biggest media merger in history was a \$340 million deal. By 1997 the 50 had shrunk to 10, one of which was created in the \$19 billion merger of Disney and ABC. Just three years later, the end of the century saw the 10 shrink to just five amidst the \$350 billion merger of AOL and Time Warner, a deal more than 1,000 times larger than “the biggest deal in history” just 17 years before.”²⁶

A monopolistic system removes diversity, something that is essential to the development of artistic practice. The destructive effects of monopolistic market systems on diversity can be seen in the research that has been done into the impact of so-called 'Big-Box' shops: “large retail stores operated by national or multinational chains”²⁷ e.g. Wal-Mart. “[A previous study] identifies several key elements of Big-Boxes including size (50-200 thousand square feet), often rectangular (hence Big-Box label), with ample parking to facilitate access by shoppers who travel to the site by car.”²⁸

A 2009 study on the effect of Big-Boxes on smaller retail outlets in the Washington D.C. Area concluded that:

“1. Within the D.C. metro area, the share of employment accounted for by Big-Box stores and larger chain stores has risen substantially at the expense of both single unit and especially smaller chain stores.

2. Much of the margin of adjustment of retail trade at the establishment level is via establishment entry or exit rather than changes in the scale of operations at the establishment level. This pattern is especially true for single unit and small chain stores.

3. The entry and growth of Big-Box stores has a substantial negative impact on employment growth and survival of single unit and smaller chain stores that operate in the same detailed industry as the Big-Box. This negative impact attenuates with distance from the Big-Box. That is, the impact is largest if the single unit or smaller chain store is within 1 mile or 1 to 5 miles of the Big-Box store relative to being 5 to 10 miles from the Big-Box. These patterns are observed in regressions controlling for local retail conditions in the immediate area.

4. We find much, if not all, of the negative impact is accounted for by increased exit. In some ways, this is not surprising since, as prior studies have shown, the extensive margin of employment adjustment is critically important for retail establishments. . .”²⁹

Whilst another study points out that:

“Wal-Mart rose to the top of the retail food chain very fast, becoming the largest grocer in the United States in 2002, only fourteen years after opening its first Supercenter. . .

. . . The largest supermarket chains – Kroger, Albertson’s, and Safeway – reduce their prices in response to Wal-Mart’s entry by less than half as much as its smaller competitors.”³⁰

26 Bob Osterdag *The Professional Suicide of A Recording Musician*, [www.bobosterdag.com](http://bobosterdag.com), http://bobosterdag.com/writings-articles-professional_suicide.htm, Accessed 31/08/2010. Quotation references: Ben H. Bagdikian, *The New Media Monopoly*, Boston: Beacon, 2004

27 John Haltiwanger, Ron Jarmin & C.J. Krizan *Mom-and-Pop meets Big-Box: Complements or Substitutes* (Washington, 2009), http://www.ces.census.gov/index.php/ces/cespapers?down_key=101883, accessed: 30/08/2010, 3

28 John Haltiwanger, Ron Jarmin & C.J. Krizan *Mom-and-Pop meets Big-Box: Complements or Substitutes* (Washington, 2009), http://www.ces.census.gov/index.php/ces/cespapers?down_key=101883, accessed: 30/08/2010, 28

29 John Haltiwanger, Ron Jarmin & C.J. Krizan *Mom-and-Pop meets Big-Box: Complements or Substitutes* (Washington, 2009), http://www.ces.census.gov/index.php/ces/cespapers?down_key=101883, accessed: 30/08/2010, 22-23

30 Emek Basker & Michael Noel *The Evolving Food Chain: Competitive Effects of Wal-Mart’s Entry into the Supermarket Industry* (2007) <http://ssrn.com/abstract=994460>, Accessed: 31/08/2010, 24-25

and that:

“On average, competitors’ response to entry by a Wal-Mart Supercenter is a price reduction of 1–1.2%, mostly due to smaller-scale competitors; the response of the “Big Three” supermarket chains (Albertson’s, Safeway, and Kroger) is less than half that size.”³¹

The market trend towards monopoly creates a situation in which the size of the most successful participants overwhelms that of the others, solely because of their suitability to operate within the conditions of a market system.

Music, again, is a good example of a type of art that is currently in the hands of monopolies. Recorded music is dominated by four big firms (Sony/BMG, Warner, Universal, EMI), who control from 85% to 90% of the national markets in the developed countries (IFPI, 2004).³² A similar monopoly can be found in the film industry, in which 6 conglomerates have 85% of the market share.³³ And in the art industry an estimated 59.8% was auctioned through only two auction house corporations (31.78% from Christie’s, 27.33% through Sotheby’s) in 2009.³⁴

Quality

In conventional economic theory, the entry of an object into a market does not alter the object itself, it simply allows it to be traded between those participating in the market. However, this is not the case; the entry of any object into a market system causes the object itself to change. A good example of this is cocaine.

The only use of cocaine, outside of its trading, is to allow people to get high. The ability of people to get high on cocaine is directly related to its purity – the higher the quality of the cocaine, the more powerful the high. Upon its entry into a market system the quality of cocaine, and therefore, its usefulness is not constant, i.e. the very usefulness of cocaine, its ability to fulfil its only function – enabling “getting high” - is completely dependent upon the market itself. The quality of the product is completely market dependent. This can be seen by looking at the quality and quantity of cocaine in the United States of America between 2006 and 2009:

31 Emek Basker & Michael Noel *The Evolving Food Chain: Competitive Effects of Wal-Mart’s Entry into the Supermarket Industry* (2007) <http://ssrn.com/abstract=994460>, Accessed: 31/08/2010, Abstract


32 Andrea Ordanini *Selection models in the music industry: How a prior independent experience may affect chart success*, *Journal of Cultural Economics* (2006) 30:183–200 pg. 184 References IFPI (International Federation of Phonographic Industry) (2004) *The recording industry. World Sales*

33	Conglomerate	US/Canada Market Share (2009) in %
	Time Warner	20.1%
	News Corporation	16.1%
	Viacom	14.3%
	Sony	14.1%
	Walt Disney	11.9%
	General Electric/Vivendi SA	10%
	Other	13.5%

Statistics from “The Numbers” <http://www.the-numbers.com/market/Distributors2009.php> Accessed: 01/09/2010.

34 *2009 Art Market Trends* 'artprice.com' http://imgpublic.artprice.com/pdf/trends2009_en.pdf Accessed: 01/09/2010, pg 14

Fig 18. Cocaine prices and purities in the United States, 2006-2009 (STRIDE). Notice how the mean wholesale price is inversely proportional to the quality – showing how quality is completely dependent upon the fickleness of the market.³⁵



As the 2010 UN World Drug Report pointed out:

“The recent decline [in cocaine usage in the United States] (since 2006) appears to have been mainly supply-driven, caused by a severe cocaine shortage. This shortage is also reflected in rapidly falling purity levels and a consequent rise in the cost per unit of pure cocaine. While street prices remained fairly stable throughout this period, purity dropped dramatically, resulting in an effective doubling of the real price of cocaine between 2006 and 2009.”³⁶

The quality of the product is directly market related. The more cocaine in the market, the higher the quality; the lower the amount of cocaine in the market, the higher the quality – with street prices remaining stable. While this is all very well in a market in which only legal drugs are being exchanged, once music is placed into a market system, a similar type of quality-fickleness, entirely determined by external economic factors take hold. Here we know longer have the problem of a ruined fridaynightparty, but a general, large-scale, market-driven degradation in the quality of human expression.

Human expression through art presents an even more complex situation than that of the cocaine trade for, instead of a semi-passive commodity undergoing a uni-directional change in quality, in the hyper-complex network of human interaction with art, there is an infinitely complicated two way response system at work. The way in which art is consumed and produced, is conditioned through learned and flexible systems of cognition. In an artistic environment in which all artistic quality is controlled by market forces, the quality of the systems learned will be of a much lower

35 UNODC, World Drug Report 2010 (United Nations Publication, Sales No. E.10.XI.13) (New York, 2010) pg. 171 http://www.unodc.org/documents/wdr/WDR_2010/World_Drug_Report_2010_lo-res.pdf Accessed: 31.08.2010

36 UNODC, World Drug Report 2010 (United Nations Publication, Sales No. E.10.XI.13) (New York, 2010) pg. 73-74 http://www.unodc.org/documents/wdr/WDR_2010/World_Drug_Report_2010_lo-res.pdf Accessed: 31.08.2010

quality and will impact upon the way the individual produces and consumes art. The art that will be produced by this individual will be of a much lower quality and this will, in turn, exacerbate the general trend of qualitative degeneracy.

However, the descent of quality is not in free-fall. As Marx points out, market systems stabilize themselves around the point at which there is the maximum discrepancy between Labour Hours and exchange-value, creating maximum surplus value. The exchange-value of a product is, to some extent, dependent upon its quality, and quality in a market system will sink to the point at which the optimum exchange-value can be realized, regardless of the quality of the product.

Innovation

Dean Keith Simonton has done research into various historiometric approaches to determining how musical popularity relates to the material used. He took 15,618 musical themes from 477 classical composers from the Renaissance to the 20th Century and, using the first six notes of each theme, programmed a computer to:

“...[tabulate] the frequencies of the various two-note transitions across all the themes, for which the probability of each transition could be easily calculated. These two-note transition probabilities were then used to measure the improbability of each of the 15,618 themes. An improbable theme is one that contains two-note transitions that are extremely rare, whereas a probable theme is one containing transitions that are extremely common. From this calculation it was easy to define a variable called *repertoire melodic originality*, which measures how rare a theme is with respect to the rest of the classical repertoire.”³⁷

He then used these computer generated scores on originality and cross-referenced them with the frequency of appearances in “catalogues of recorded performances, music appreciation dictionaries, student scores, concert and record-buying guides, thematic dictionaries, and encyclopaedias”³⁸. As he concludes,

“... the computer generated scores on melodic originality also predict repertoire popularity! In particular, the popularity of a composition is an inverted backwards-J function of originality...That is, the most successful works fall in the middle range, whereas those compositions whose themes are either very low in melodic originality or very high will be less popular, on average. However, if the choice is between low and high originality, the former will more likely receive the accolades. Furthermore, this is not the only melodic attribute that exhibits this relationship. Similar inverted-U functions hold for melodic originality variation and for metric originality (Simonton 1987).”³⁹


The market, driven by popularity, tends towards an average of musical originality rather than fuelling the excesses and extremes which create exciting new art, as can be seen by Dr Simonton's graph, reproduced below.

37 Dean Keith Simonton *Products, Persons, and Periods*, “The Social Psychology Of Music”, Ed. David K. Hargreaves & Adrian C. North (Oxford, 1997), 109

38 Ibid.

39 Dean Keith Simonton *Products, Persons, and Periods*, “The Social Psychology Of Music”, Ed. David K. Hargreaves & Adrian C. North (Oxford, 1997), 111

Fig. 19 The Curvilinear relationship between repertoire popularity and melodic originality for 15,618 themes in classical music⁴⁰.



The free-market system is based upon what motivational psychologists refer to as the “carrot and stick approach”, an idea that by punishing bad behaviour and rewarding good behaviour you can increase productivity by encouraging more of the behaviour you want and less of that which you do not. However, much of the research done by motivational psychologists shows that this technique of reward and punishment is only successful for mechanical tasks, which is why this approach was able to drive the industrial revolution. When it comes to creative tasks, this approach becomes more problematic. Dan Pink collates much of the research into this area of motivational psychology in his book *Drive*, in which there are two studies he mentions that are especially interesting to any consideration of art and the role of creativity within a free-market system.

“...a quartet of economists ...set up shop in Madurai, India, to gauge the effects of extrinsic incentives on performance. Because the cost of living in rural India is much lower than in North America, the researchers could offer large rewards without breaking their own banks.

They recruited eighty-seven participants and asked them to play several games-for example, tossing tennis balls at a target, unscrambling anagrams, recalling a string of digits-that required motor skills, creativity, or concentration. To test the power of incentives, the experimenters offered three types of rewards for reaching certain performance levels.

One-third of the participants could earn a small reward-4 rupees (at the time worth around 50 U.S. Cents and equal to about a day's pay in adurai) for reaching their performance targets. One-third could earn a medium reward-40 rupees (about \$5, or two weeks' pay). And one-third could earn a very large reward-400 rupees (about \$50, or nearly five months' pay).

What happened? Did the size of the reward predict the quality of the performance?

Yes. But not in the way you might expect. As it turned out, the people offered the medium-sized bonus didn't perform any better than those offered the small one. And those in the 400-rupee super-incentivized group? They fared worst of all. By nearly every measure, they lagged behind both the low-reward and medium-reward participants. Reporting the results for the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, the researchers wrote, 'In eight of the nine tasks we examined across the three experiments, higher incentives led to *worse* performance'⁴¹

“Teresa Amabile, the Harvard Business School professor and one of the world's leading researchers on creativity, has frequently tested the effects of contingent rewards on the creative process. In one study, she and two colleagues recruited twenty-three professional artists from the United States who had produced both commissioned and noncommissioned artwork. They asked the artists to randomly select ten commissioned works and ten noncommissioned works. The Amabile

40 Dean Keith Simonton *Products, Persons, and Periods*, “The Social Psychology Of Music”, Ed. David K. Hargreaves & Adrian C. North (Oxford, 1997), 112

41 Dan Pink *Drive* (New York, 2009), 40-41

and her team gave the works to a panel of accomplished artists and curators, who knew nothing about the study, and asked the experts to rate the pieces in creativity and technical skill.

'Our results were quite startling', the researchers wrote. 'The commissioned works were rated as significantly less creative than the non-commissioned works, yet they were not rated as different in technical quality.'⁴²

These results have been replicated in many different experiments with similar conclusions; for mechanical or algorithmic tasks, monetary rewards and the carrot/stick approach are extremely successful, but for a task requiring anything more than “rudimentary cognitive skill”, the reward causes worse performance.

The free-market system cannot offer the artist anything more than monetary incentives. Its entire set-up of monetary rewards that override intrinsic motivation is destined to produce artworks of impaired creativity. It is destined to create a *Subprime Culture* *pace* Runnels.

42 Dan Pink *Drive* (New York, 2009), 44-45

Conclusions

The move of publically-funded art into a free-market system; a move that can be clearly seen in the re-prioritization of the *ASKO Schoenberg Ensemble's* performance priorities; is destined to create a subprime culture because the free-market is fundamentally incapable of nurturing the diversity, quality and innovation that contemporary music needs to blossom. In this manoeuvre, organizations not only fail to observe basic operating principles of the market in a vain attempt to justify themselves to their funders by criteria they ill understand. By ignoring the ideas of Category Positioning and the Economy of Scarcity, fundees leave themselves in a vulnerable position, presuming that by conforming to the trends of the marketplace they will be able to ensure their economic survival, despite the fact that the very essence of the performing arts is infected with a cost disease that constantly undermines its financial viability.

The interaction of money and art is a relentlessly damaging one and if the research into motivational psychology holds true, then questions about the investment in subprime art cannot be confined simply to the private funding sphere of the free-market. From our investigations into the structure and workings of the Dutch public subsidy system, it is clear to see that there is a lot of money in circulation – could it be that the very money that is attempting to ensure the continuation of European art could be sowing its downfall? Perhaps there is only one conclusion: that *no art should be bought or sold*. The transformation of art into a commodity and its entering into the marketplace creates fundamental changes that undermine its financial and cultural value – if the very money we are using to commission art is causing the quality to drop by robbing the artist of their intrinsic motivation, then the monetary transaction itself becomes an automatic investment in subprime art and, like any subprime system, there will be a point at which it collapses.

The collapse of the subprime art system will not only bring about the destruction of the system itself but, most likely, the entirety of western art. As I explained at the beginning of this paper, my choice to use the Netherlands for this type of analysis was not simply out of convenience. The Dutch funding system is one that mirrors many of those in operation throughout Europe, the problems that we have identified in this paper are undoubtedly in action throughout the rest of the continent and, possibly even further afield.

So, what can be done? The public funding of art has throughout the last century, been used as a counter-balance to the rampaging might of the capitalist free-market system. Through the public funding of art, governments attempted to give the population access to that which had characteristics other than commercial viability, which dominated those arts tied to the free-market. The abandoning of the principle of *correcting for errors in the market* has undermined the very essence of public funding, and is instead fuelling a growing subprime crisis in the arts. Unless fundees are willing to take back the initiative to make art regardless of monetary reward and to place themselves in bold opposition to the trends of the marketplace then, not only will they nullify the very need for their existence in the first place, but they will also find themselves contributing to the subprime culture. If government funding continues to move in the direction of the market, then it should be dismantled. If fundees continue to move in the way of the market, then they should be de-funded.

No art should be bought or sold. This does not mean that no art should be funded, simply that this funding should operate in such a way as to never usurp the primacy of intrinsic artistic motivation. Money can be used to cover material costs, but nobody should ever be paid for their work. Art is one of the few things not fully subsumed under the power of capital, let us try to

keep it that way.

Appendix I

Nederlands Fonds voor Podium Kunst Four Year Subsidies for 2009-2013

Organization	Subsidy Amount	Percentage of Total Four Year Subsidies
Stichting Dutch Jazz Competitionmuziek	€ 20,987.00	0.06%
Stichting Aselemuziek	€ 29,075.00	0.08%
Stichting Pro Moodsmuziek	€ 30,022.00	0.08%
Matangi Strijkkwartetmuziek	€ 31,477.00	0.08%
Stichting Amstel Saxofoon Kwartetmuziek	€ 33,414.00	0.09%
Stichting Liszt Concoursmuziek	€ 36,470.00	0.10%
Stichting Sonic Actsfestivals	€ 46,972.00	0.13%
Stichting Alfafestivals	€ 47,224.00	0.13%
Internationaal Orgelfestival Haarlemmuziek	€ 47,277.00	0.13%
Stichting Rubens Kwartetmuziek	€ 51,634.00	0.14%
Stichting Amsterdam Dance Eventfestivals	€ 51,950.00	0.14%
Stichting s-Hertogenbosch Muziekstadmuziek	€ 52,104.00	0.14%
Stichting Internationale Koorbiennale Haarlemfestivals	€ 52,365.00	0.14%
Stichting Amsterdams Kleinkunst Festivalfestivals	€ 52,424.00	0.14%
Stichting Nederlands Kameropera Festivalfestivals	€ 57,223.00	0.15%
Stichting Dunya Festivalfestivals	€ 62,627.00	0.17%
Stichting Paul van Kemenade Quintetmuziek	€ 68,709.00	0.18%
Stichting Motel Mozaïquefestivals	€ 78,929.00	0.21%
Stichting Baranámuziek	€ 79,024.00	0.21%
Stichting Jonge Hartenfestivals	€ 88,499.00	0.24%
Stichting Steun Holland Baroque Societymuziek	€ 89,372.00	0.24%
Stichting Ons Theaterproduktiesmuziektheater	€ 94,845.00	0.26%
Stichting Elektra Bloutheater	€ 104,511.00	0.28%
Stichting Its Festivalfestivals	€ 104,709.00	0.28%
Stichting De Oefening de Kunst (dOeK)muziek	€ 104,719.00	0.28%
Stichting Instant Composers Poolmuziek	€ 105,221.00	0.28%
Stichting Jazz in Motionmuziek	€ 105,390.00	0.28%
Stichting Brokkenmuziek	€ 105,438.00	0.28%
Stichting Tetzepimuziek	€ 105,529.00	0.28%
Stichting Camerata Trajectinamuziek	€ 114,493.00	0.31%
Stichting Studio Peertheater	€ 120,670.00	0.32%
Stichting Nederlandse Dansdagenfestivals	€ 129,784.00	0.35%
Stichting Rosa Ensemblemuziektheater	€ 131,203.00	0.35%
Stichting Kameroperahuismuziektheater	€ 131,420.00	0.35%
Stichting Musica Sacra Maastrichtfestivals	€ 132,079.00	0.36%
Stichting Theaterfestival Boulevard s-Hertogenboschfestivals	€ 146,926.00	0.40%
Stichting Opera Rotterdamfestivals	€ 150,000.00	0.40%
Stichting Vrije Valmuziektheater	€ 150,000.00	0.40%
Stichting Julidansfestivals	€ 155,316.00	0.42%
Stichting De (Internationale) Keuzefestivals	€ 155,376.00	0.42%
Stichting Spanga Het Verona van Weststellingwerfmuziektheater	€ 155,641.00	0.42%
Stichting Moderne Dans en Bewegingfestivals	€ 157,187.00	0.42%
Stichting Caspar Rapaktheater	€ 157,264.00	0.42%
Vereniging De Erepijismuziek	€ 157,412.00	0.42%
Stichting Slagwerkgroep Den Haagmuziek	€ 157,453.00	0.42%
Stichting Intromuziek	€ 157,531.00	0.42%
Stichting Muziektheater Hollands Diepmuziektheater	€ 167,784.00	0.45%
Stichting PIPS :Labmuziektheater	€ 183,572.00	0.49%
Stichting Likemindstheater	€ 183,850.00	0.49%
Stichting Bik Bent Braammuziek	€ 185,261.00	0.50%
Stichting De Theaterdagenfestivals	€ 192,549.00	0.52%
Stichting Kassystheater	€ 200,079.00	0.54%
Stichting November Musicfestivals	€ 200,202.00	0.54%
Stichting Kulsanmuziek	€ 209,892.00	0.56%
Stichting Theater Gnaffeltheater	€ 210,329.00	0.57%
Stichting Marmouchamuziek	€ 211,267.00	0.57%
Stichting Plotloos Dramatheater	€ 215,044.00	0.58%
Stichting Mungangatheater	€ 220,935.00	0.59%
Stichting Moer-Staal (De Kift)muziek	€ 230,295.00	0.62%
Stichting Toneelgroep Het Volktheater	€ 231,716.00	0.62%
Stichting Het Volksoperahuismuziektheater	€ 237,290.00	0.64%
Stichting Ives Ensemblemuziek	€ 239,232.00	0.64%
Stichting The Glasshousetheater	€ 241,467.00	0.65%
Kameropera Stichting Trionformuziektheater	€ 242,235.00	0.65%
Stichting Bewegingsalarmtheater	€ 257,935.00	0.69%
Stichting Poppentheater Kollektieftheater	€ 260,309.00	0.70%
Stichting Suburbiatheater	€ 262,548.00	0.71%

Stichting TRASHdans	€ 263,664.00	0.71%
Stichting mightysocietytheater	€ 283,652.00	0.76%
Stichting ZEP-projectentheater	€ 284,022.00	0.76%
Stichting Festival Bureau Stormfestivals	€ 286,279.00	0.77%
Stichting Bambietheater	€ 289,312.00	0.78%
Stichting A3anadans	€ 300,000.00	0.81%
Stichting Noorderzon Groningenfestivals	€ 301,541.00	0.81%
Stichting Pelstheater	€ 313,510.00	0.84%
Stichting PeerGrouPtheater	€ 313,964.00	0.84%
Stichting Firma Riex Swartetheater	€ 315,506.00	0.85%
Stichting Toneelgroep De Appeltheater	€ 337,090.00	0.91%
Stichting YOfestivals	€ 361,779.00	0.97%
Stichting Theater van de Verbeeldingtheater	€ 367,090.00	0.99%
Female Economytheater	€ 367,503.00	0.99%
Stichting Stuijtheater	€ 367,674.00	0.99%
Stichting Golden Palacetheater	€ 388,912.00	1.05%
Stichting Het Toneelschap Beumer & Drosttheater	€ 389,322.00	1.05%
Stichting Dansvoorziening Noorddans	€ 389,954.00	1.05%
Stichting Carvertheater	€ 394,156.00	1.06%
Stichting Vis-à-Vistheater	€ 394,369.00	1.06%
Acteursgroep Wunderbaumtheater	€ 396,839.00	1.07%
Stichting RAST - Nederlands-Turks Theater Ateliertheater	€ 405,142.00	1.09%
Stichting Terschellings Oerol Festivalfestivals	€ 419,849.00	1.13%
Stichting Keesen & Cotheater	€ 420,466.00	1.13%
Stichting Cappella Amsterdammuziek	€ 420,647.00	1.13%
Stichting De Bendetheater	€ 430,428.00	1.16%
Stichting Mug met de Gouden Tandtheater	€ 471,066.00	1.27%
Stichting 't Barre Landtheater	€ 478,042.00	1.29%
Stichting Combattimento Consort Amsterdammuziek	€ 495,111.00	1.33%
Stichting Xynixmuziektheater	€ 535,021.00	1.44%
Stichting Dood Paardtheater	€ 603,762.00	1.62%
Stichting De Nieuw Amsterdamtheater	€ 611,048.00	1.64%
Stichting Het Toneel Speelttheater	€ 628,171.00	1.69%
Stichting ISHDans	€ 629,126.00	1.69%
Stichting Speelttheater Hollandtheater	€ 644,661.00	1.73%
Stichting Conny Janssen Danstdans	€ 647,697.00	1.74%
Stichting Amsterdam Sinfoniettamuziek	€ 651,284.00	1.75%
Stichting Datedans	€ 663,307.00	1.78%
Stichting De Veenfabriekmuziektheater	€ 708,212.00	1.91%
Stichting het Nederlands Blazers Ensemblemuziek	€ 817,547.00	2.20%
Stichting Nieuw Ensemblemuziek	€ 841,205.00	2.26%
Stichting Zwaanproductiesdans	€ 851,837.00	2.29%
Asko Schönbergmuziek	€ 1,155,563.00	3.11%
Coöperatieve Vereniging Onafhankelijk Toneel UAtheater	€ 1,260,702.00	3.39%
Stichting Orkatertheater	€ 1,547,369.00	4.16%
Stichting Nederlands Kamerkoormuziek	€ 1,894,133.00	5.10%
Het Internationaal Danstheaterdans	€ 2,845,652.00	7.66%
Total:	£37,164,872.00	

Appendix II

Amount received by named composers (2009-2011). Amount is calculated by adding together composition bursaries, grants, commissions and travel expenses.

COMPOSER	AMOUNT
Rijnos, R.	€ 102,900
Putte, Jan van de	€ 90,875
Vries K	€ 87,750
Tarenskeen, Boudewijn	€ 86,325
Meijering , Chiel	€ 86,000
Zuidam R.	€ 85,800
Aa M.	€ 81,000
Vriend, Jan	€ 80,750
Ketting, O.	€ 79,200
Verbey T.	€ 79,200
Adriaansz, Peter	€ 76,500
Rossum, Piet-Jan van	€ 75,250
Dramm, David	€ 74,500
Boogman, Willem	€ 74,250
Verbugt, Eric	€ 73,100
Kulenty, Hanna	€ 72,250
Tsoupaki, Calliope	€ 68,000
Koolmees H.	€ 66,000
Raaf R.	€ 66,000
Vleggaar, Giel	€ 66,000
Beurden, Bernard van	€ 63,600
Lann , Vanessa	€ 59,950
Moore, K.	€ 53,095
Andriessen, L	€ 53,025
Kyriakides Y.	€ 51,500
Roukens , Joey	€ 51,300
Boer, Ed de	€ 51,025
Maier F.	€ 48,150
Hirs, Rozalie	€ 45,370
Morales, Hugo Murguia	€ 42,700
Norden, Maarten van	€ 40,500
Rijswijk, Rob van	€ 40,000
Strijbos, Jeroen	€ 40,000
Simons M.	€ 39,925
Oh, Seung Ah-	€ 39,750
Orozoco, Keyla	€ 39,200
Altena, M	€ 38,600
Torstensson, Klas	€ 38,250
Janssen, Guus	€ 38,100
Hamburg J.	€ 37,825
Vrees de B.	€ 36,950
Ankersmit, Thomas	€ 36,000
Berge, Anne La	€ 36,000
Binsbergen, Corrie	€ 36,000
Dijkstra, Jorrit	€ 36,000
Fondse, Martin	€ 36,000
Klein, Tobias	€ 36,000
Kruisselbrink, Astrid	€ 36,000
Omstein, Maarten	€ 36,000
Reijseger, Ernst	€ 36,000
Veenendaal, Albert van	€ 36,000
Roijé G	€ 34,250
Noordegraaf Arnoud	€ 33,525

COMPOSER	AMOUNT
Veldhuis ter J.	€ 33,525
Braam , Michiel	€ 33,500
Nahhon, R	€ 33,125
Ciciliani, M	€ 33,000
Emmer H.	€ 33,000
Namavar , Reza	€ 31,575
Kanter, Fant de	€ 31,175
Bulsink, W	€ 29,150
Isadora, A	€ 28,225
Baroni, Claudio	€ 25,875
Onna P. van	€ 25,700
Visman, B.	€ 25,475
Arends, A	€ 25,400
Verduin J.	€ 25,400
Graaff H de	€ 25,235
Zeeland , Cees van	€ 23,000
Taazelaar K.	€ 22,775
Delft, Marc van	€ 22,550
Kadar, M	€ 22,550
Hamel M.	€ 22,400
Vriezen S.	€ 22,075
Man R de	€ 21,775
Nas, M.	€ 21,055
Harden, P	€ 21,000
Rumondor, Claudia	€ 20,750
Glowicka, K.	€ 20,300
Mensingh , Michiel	€ 20,300
Brugge P.	€ 20,000
Ayers, Richard	€ 19,850
Vega H.	€ 19,025
Gouder de Beauregard C.	€ 19,000
Bollen, Jan-Bas	€ 18,700
Germanus , Sander	€ 18,300
Brouwer, A	€ 17,900
Dijk, Gijs van	€ 17,850
Snoei W.	€ 17,750
Vrolijk, R.	€ 17,600
Manneke D.	€ 17,500
Roo de M.	€ 17,100
Fulkerson J.	€ 16,900
Beljon, G	€ 16,700
Oosten, Roel van	€ 16,250
Verlaan , Daan	€ 16,225
Wagenaar A.	€ 15,925
Schönberger E.	€ 15,750
Gutzeit B.	€ 15,000
Goorhuis R.	€ 14,800
Soifer D.	€ 14,750
End F.	€ 14,500
Herder G.	€ 14,300
Jansen B.	€ 14,260
Wijck F.	€ 13,975
Dongen , Bart van	€ 13,950

COMPOSER	AMOUNT
Vidjay Beerepoot	€ 13,700
Michans, C	€ 13,500
Clerq, de E	€ 13,450
Leenhouts P.	€ 13,300
Yurtsevich A.	€ 13,300
Het Orkest	€ 13,200
Huijbregts, Nico	€ 13,100
Wullur S.	€ 13,000
Fiumara, A.	€ 12,925
Bisschops, Merijn	€ 12,800
Tlalim T.	€ 12,800
Velickovic J	€ 12,800
Koendera, M.	€ 12,150
Anke Brouwer	€ 12,000
Kluitenberg A.	€ 11,700
Woof B.	€ 11,400
Numan T.	€ 11,375
Kox H.	€ 11,050
Aust, Renard A.	€ 11,000
Bergeijk, Gilius van	€ 11,000
Joey Roukens	€ 11,000
Mukarno Ph.	€ 11,000
Oorebeek C. van	€ 10,950
Samama L.	€ 10,900
Bruinen, P	€ 10,600
Adie Ph.	€ 10,300
Knigge M.	€ 10,300
Waller J. F.	€ 10,250
Deurzen, P	€ 10,000
Nelissen B.	€ 10,000
Wiegers B.	€ 10,000
Zimmerman B.	€ 9,925
Holt K.	€ 9,700
Boiten J.	€ 9,250
Eijden, Cynthie van	€ 9,000
Overwater, Tony	€ 9,000
Sporck J.	€ 8,975
Heumen, Robert van	€ 8,900
Wit H.	€ 8,800
Zegers K.	€ 8,800
Geel an O.	€ 8,700
Ploeger D.	€ 8,700
Figarova A.	€ 8,500
Wang P.	€ 8,300
Gaasbeek M.	€ 8,200
Myrmel T.	€ 7,925
Kleppe J.	€ 7,900
Graan, D.	€ 7,700
Simons L.	€ 7,500
Top E.	€ 7,500
Menalled, Ezequiel	€ 7,325
Arditto, C	€ 7,010
Bastien,	€ 7,000

COMPOSER	AMOUNT
Donk, Dyana	€ 7,000
Zuydervelt,	€ 7,000
Mc.Gowan N.	€ 6,700
Spaan B.	€ 6,700
Stepancic T.	€ 6,700
Goldewijk Y.	€ 6,650
Voorvelt M.	€ 6,600
Boersen R.	€ 6,000
Crijns, Frank	€ 6,000
Emmerik I.	€ 6,000
Lindquist E.	€ 6,000
Morales D.I.	€ 6,000
Roosendaal E.	€ 6,000
Tamminga J.	€ 6,000
Wieringa K.	€ 6,000
Flett G.	€ 5,900
Fahres, M.	€ 5,850
Matamala A.	€ 5,750
Wiegerink L.	€ 5,750
Breuker W.	€ 5,700
Nasopoulou A.	€ 5,200
Schomo D.	€ 5,200
Henneman I.	€ 5,025
Cross D.	€ 5,000
Kimman J.	€ 5,000
Eck C.	€ 4,500
Medyulyanova P.	€ 4,500
Momotenko A.	€ 4,500
Rangel N.	€ 4,500
Roemers K.	€ 4,500
Wierckx, Marcel	€ 4,500
Balkom J.	€ 4,400
Keulen van G.	€ 4,375
Eisenga D.	€ 4,300
Rossem A.	€ 4,300
Wammes A.	€ 4,300
Nasveld R.	€ 4,000
Strien, Janfie van	€ 4,000
Schilstra B.	€ 3,936
Korobanjko N.	€ 3,921
Kanter T.	€ 3,800
Platen van M.	€ 3,800
Szwed K.	€ 3,800
Wagner C.	€ 3,800
Uijlenhoet R.	€ 3,700
Hijmans, Wiek	€ 3,500
Mihajlovic A.	€ 3,400
Momoten F.	€ 3,400
Filmfestival R'dam	€ 3,300
Ruiter de W.	€ 3,300
Kinkelder D.	€ 3,200
Sato N.	€ 3,200
Trujillo G.	€ 3,100

COMPOSER	AMOUNT
Padding, M	€ 3,015
Bruin de M.	€ 3,000
Sbaiti L.	€ 3,000
Yang J.	€ 3,000
Klooster A.	€ 2,970
Horsthuis M.	€ 2,950
Maessen S.	€ 2,900
Olthuis K.	€ 2,725
Achim A.	€ 2,530
Bondt, C de	€ 2,530
Goedman J.	€ 2,530
Korff de Gidts	€ 2,530
Bank J.	€ 2,275
Bagaglio M.	€ 2,200
Bol I.	€ 2,200
Stichting Ambiance Tracks	€ 2,190
Titre M.L.	€ 2,100
Wagemans P.J.	€ 2,100
Jimink T.	€ 2,000
Klaveren W.	€ 2,000
Koziel A.	€ 2,000
Jeths W.	€ 1,950
Kasteelen I.	€ 1,900
Arntzen K.	€ 1,500
Meijer M.	€ 1,500
Stichting Starvinsky Orkestar	€ 1,180
Geertens G.	€ 1,175
Meulen W.	€ 1,140
McGowan E.L.	€ 1,050
Meijer A.	€ 750
Albersen Verhuur BV	€ 700
Zamler-Carhart S.	€ 660
TOTAL:	€ 4,957,257

Appendix III

Number of performances of repertoire by ASKO Schoenberg Ensemble (1 January 2011- 31 December 2011)

Concert	Number of Performances	Percentage of Output
Chiel Meijering/Diego Soifer/Toek Numan	1	0.89
Julia Wolfe/Joey Roukens/Anthony Fiumara/Arnold Marinnisen/Steve Reich	1	0.89
Knussen/Julian Anderson/Helen Grime	1	0.89
Kurt Weill/Guus Janssen/GK Gruber	1	0.89
Middelbare Kinderen	1	0.89
Moesorgski/Valery Voronov/Vladimir Tarnopolski	1	0.89
Pierre Boulez	1	0.89
Steve Reich Tehilim	1	0.89
Julia Wolfe/Wojceich Ziemowitzych	1	0.89
Goebaidoelina/Faradzj Karajev/Anton Webern	1	0.89
Goebaidoelina	1	0.89
Franz Schreker/Wolfgang Rihm/Jorg Widmann	1	0.89
Yannis Kyriakides/Rozalie Hirs/Unsuk Chin	1	0.89
Jorg Widman/Wolfgang Rihm	1	0.89
John Adams	1	0.89
Darius Milhaud	1	0.89
Mahler	2	1.79
Platteland als Podium	2	1.79
Theo Leovendie	2	1.79
Yannis Kyriakides/Rozalie Hirs	2	1.79
Alfred Schnittke	2	1.79
9x7	3	2.68
Chiel Meijering/Diego Soifer/Toek Numan	3	2.68
Darius Milhaud/Stravinsky/Kurt Weill/Sergej Prokofiev	3	2.68
Oestvolskaja	3	2.68
Bartok	3	2.68
Richard Ayers	3	2.68
Huba De Graaff	6	5.36
Iannis Xenakis – Een Oresteia	7	6.25
Threepenny Opera	55	49.11
TOTAL	112	